Reaching the Limits

China as a Responsible Stakeholder

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About the Author

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Introduction

In his opening speech at the 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, President Barack Obama proclaimed that the United States-China relationship will shape the twenty-first century and issued a clarion call to both Beijing and his own administration:

Will nations and peoples define themselves solely by their differences or can we find common ground to meet our challenges?

He continued:

This dialogue will help determine the ultimate destination of that journey. It represents a commitment to shape our young century through sustained cooperation, and not confrontation.¹

The contemporary search for genuine strategic cooperation with China by George W. Bush in his second term and the Obama administration was summed up in a 2005 speech by then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick urging China to rise as a “responsible stakeholder” within the U.S.-led global security and economic system— a system characterized by open markets, security alliances, multinational cooperation, rule of law, and democratic community. Recognizing that China has undoubtedly benefitted more from the stable international environment over the past three decades than any other country, that framework is not designed to “contain” China but to “shape” its strategic objectives and tactical choices. As Thomas Christensen explains, American regional leadership “helps channel China’s competitive energies in more beneficial and peaceful directions,” concluding “it is in China’s strategic interest as a rising power to exert greater effort to help maintain the system” that has allowed it to rise in the first place.³

Was such an approach ever plausible? This paper argues that although Beijing’s behavior has been shaped and tempered by interaction with the U.S. and from being a beneficiary of the existing regional and global order, Washington’s capacity to “tame” China is limited and becoming weaker over time. Even though the People’s Republic of China is largely rising within the existing system, it is also a security “free-rider” and an occasionally subversive participant within this system. While the “responsible stakeholder” framework has been useful in shaping Beijing’s short-term tactical choices, it has been much less effective in shaping or changing China’s long-term strategic objectives. As an “insider,” China is increasingly challenging American military and non-military pre-eminence by attempting to dilute American power, influence, and alliances—with early but significant success.

More broadly, and despite generally seeking cooperation rather than confrontation, China has long viewed the United States as its primary strategic competitor.⁴ Although Beijing recognizes that the American presence currently provides much needed stability in Asia, its frequently stated goal of Asian preponderance is directly at odds with continued U.S. leadership in Asia. Far from accepting Washington’s pre-eminence in Asia as permanent, Beijing has been simply “biding its time” while
building what Chinese officials and strategists call China’s “comprehensive national power (综合国力).”

Finally, by denying the reality that China is both an economic partner and a strategic competitor in the search for something more idealistic, the United States is leaving itself fewer options should the “responsible stakeholder” framework gradually fail—rather than hedging against alternate possibilities by maintaining a robust military and network of alliances. This approach is short-sighted since current Chinese strategy is precisely designed to dilute the strength of Washington’s alliances and ensure that the military, economic, and political costs of possible American military action in Asia against China are prohibitive.

Although China may yet emerge as a “responsible stakeholder” against current evidence and trends, this paper argues that a much more prudent course is to explicitly recognize that “strategic competition” with China is endemic, whilst continuing to seek avenues for tactical cooperation on bilateral and global issues. Doing so is much more likely to prolong American leadership in Asia by directly counteracting Chinese initiatives designed to maximize its influence in Asia at the expense of Washington’s. If the PRC and thus the Chinese Communist Party continue to rise, explicitly recognizing the reality of strategic competition also makes it more likely that political, military, and economic competition will be increasingly circumscribed and bounded over time rather than unrestrained and unpredictable.

### Reaching the Limits of China as “Responsible Stakeholder”

America’s preferred model for managing rising powers is based on its experience with post-World War II Japan: an economically powerful and politically cooperative ally but strategically dormant and militarily inhibited. Realizing that these restrictions could not be imposed onto China, the “responsible stakeholder” approach is designed to achieve the next best thing: “manage” China’s benign re-emergence and integration into the existing system. “Managing” China’s rise as a “responsible stakeholder” means more than just avoiding conflict with it. It entails Beijing committing to actively uphold and preserve the existing U.S.-led order as China rises. However, the framework of encouraging China to be a “responsible stakeholder” is ill-suited to China and failing for a number of reasons.

#### a) Confusing “means” with “ends”

From the American point of view, the “responsible stakeholder” approach is designed to structurally entrench China as a status quo power within the system since China has been allowed to emerge as a beneficiary of the current U.S.-led order. As China freely admits, it benefits enormously from the U.S. naval role in the South China Sea, which keeps the peace and creates helpful conditions for trade and commerce to thrive.

However, Washington is erroneously assuming that it is shaping Chinese foreign policy, strategic goals, and purposes. In reality, Beijing is merely using the “responsible stakeholder” framework to further its own position and influence. While the United States devotes ships, troops, and money to uphold the current American-
led order in Asia, China benefits as a security free-rider in the region rather than as a trusted contributor. Internal debates within China reveal that Beijing is using the current period as a transient phase to bide its time while building what it terms Chinese “comprehensive national power.” In particular, Beijing’s leaders and strategists do not accept the permanent pre-eminence of the American Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. This is persuasively illustrated by the rapid increase in China’s military capacity. The country’s force modernization and projection program has been growing at double digit rates each year since the early 1990s.

Revealingly, China’s “next generation” force development and technologies (such as cyber-war capabilities and anti-satellite missiles) are specifically designed to counteract and degrade American capabilities and military networks in the region. Its submarine fleet is growing at around three new vessels every year, making it the fastest expanding fleet in the world. The PLA has developed a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and new models (such as adaptations of the DF-21 missile) that are specifically designed to target US aircraft carriers from mobile launchers. This rapid development of various forms of sea denial capabilities (submarines and DF-21 missiles) are not compatible with a rising power willing to accept the pre-eminence of the American naval role in East Asia and the South China Sea. At the very least, China’s force modernization and doctrine are cleverly designed to make the costs of military intervention in East Asia prohibitive for America.

This growing military capacity is significant since Beijing repeatedly claims around 90% of the U.S. patrolled South China Sea as its “historic waters.” These advances are also inconsistent with the still resilient argument in some American strategic commentary that China’s force modernization program is primarily focused on preventing Taiwanese independence, or that China remains overwhelmingly preoccupied with “domestic economic development” for the next decades. Moreover, the common observation that China is simply acquiring a military capability that is commensurate with its rising economic strength is correct but irrelevant in this context. The point is that Beijing is not prepared to accept future American military dominance in the Pacific Ocean (and possibly Indian Ocean) and is already engaging in relentless military competition to eventually contest the military status quo.

As the latest 2015 China Defense White Paper openly admits, Chinese force modernization is designed to counter the U.S. “rebalancing strategy” and Japan’s alleged desire to abandon its more restrained post-war military and security policies. According to the document, the PLA is also rapidly modernizing in order to protect what Beijing sees as China’s sovereign and maritime rights with respect to not just Taiwan but also the South China Sea.

More broadly, the “responsible stakeholder” framework assumes that Chinese interests and ambitions are not pre-existing or pre-determined but “plastic” and can be molded according to the circumstances of China’s rise. But this argument ignores compelling historical and contemporary evidence that China is predisposed to seek leadership of Asia and to recast regional order according to its preference. After all, the country’s political, strategic, and social elites see reclaiming China’s past historical and cultural pre-eminence in Asia as inseparable from its modern destiny. As CCP leaders repeatedly point out, China has been the dominant civilization in Asia for
3,000 years and has had the largest economy in the world for 18 of the past 29 centuries. Yet, after a period of instability and chaos, it is emerging within an American-led regional order that it had no part in defining or shaping.

There is now a broad consensus amongst CCP officials and social elites that regaining China’s paramount place in the region is inextricable from reversing its 150 years of humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese powers. The latest grand articulation of this vision is President Xi Jinping’s “China dream” or “China rejuvenation” idea which is not new or a departure from the priorities of Xi’s predecessors. The explicit long-term objective of achieving “preponderance” in Asia for leaders since Deng Xiaoping differ only with respect to how long it might take and shifts in tactical decision-making to seize unexpected windows of opportunities as they arise. Thus, the U.S. cannot shape the PRC’s ultimate objectives or strategy; all the U.S. can do is shape the means by which the CCP will go about pursuing its interests.

b) The False Hope of Political Reform in China

There is a very close association between Beijing’s rise as a “responsible stakeholder” within the U.S.-led order and the emergence of a democratic China in Asia. After all, American “constructive engagement” with China, which began under the Bill Clinton administration, was explicitly designed to hasten political reform in China; the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have subsequently justified the continued economic and strategic engagement with China in similar terms.

The hope that by becoming more integrated into the existing economic and diplomatic order, China will take bigger steps towards political reform and democratization is important to Washington for several reasons.

First, a more liberal and pluralistic Chinese political-society would improve the prospect of China becoming more receptive to regional and global norms. As recent issues such as Google’s battle with Chinese authorities over censorship and ongoing concerns with Chinese state-sponsored cyber-attacks on foreign firms demonstrate, differences over norms such as transparency, rule of law, and government restraint will continue to exacerbate tensions between China and liberal-democratic systems such as the United States.

Second, Washington would feel much more comfortable if China developed a stronger regard for human rights, as has occurred in many countries throughout Asia. This would make issues such as Taiwan much less problematic since Washington would be more willing to eventually accept the reunification of Taiwan with China, so long as that is what the two sides agree to. The CCP’s greater respect for human rights would also allay American concerns about the regime’s governance in areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

Third, the emergence of a liberal-democratic China would mean that the United States and regional countries will become more willing to accept Chinese political and strategic leadership in Asia as China’s economic power grows. In the longer term, it is arguable that Washington would be much more prepared to cede influence to a democratic China in Asia in a gradual and peaceful manner, just as Britain did for America in regions such as the Middle East and Southeast Asia throughout the previous century. This would be much more conducive to continued peace, stability,
and prosperity in the region than the scenario in which a rising China would remain an authoritarian state.

This liberal-democratic evolution certainly occurred in many East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but we should not ignore the historical context of these events. Countries such as Japan were losers in World War II whereas China was a notional winner. A defeated and devastated Japan had no choice but to accept the terms of the new dominant power in Asia in the form of the United States and take on board Washington’s expectations that Japan should eventually liberalize. In addition, Japan remained reliant on American might for its security needs after the war.

Moreover, while previous authoritarian leaders and their human rights record in countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were routinely criticized by Washington, they knew that America would do little to seriously undermine the governments in these countries due to the exigencies of the Cold War. In contrast, the CCP—whose overwhelming priority is to remain in power—faces a contemporary “coalition of democratic states” (America, Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia) pushing for political reform in China.

Therefore, far from welcoming integration into the U.S.-led order, as the “responsible stakeholder” framework implies, Beijing fears it. Even during the Bill Clinton years, senior People’s Liberation Army officers feared that Washington’s commitment to engagement was simply another way of subverting the CCP and perfecting the “soft containment” of China.13

Contemporary Chinese strategists observe that the post-Cold War “enemies of America” are authoritarian states such as Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Examination of strategic writings and political memos indicate that there is a (accurate) belief in China that Washington will seek to limit Chinese power and influence as long the country remains under the single-party rule of the CCP.

For example, an article by influential Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing argues that “the theoretical problem” of American foreign policy is the “hegemonic maintenance” of a liberal order rather than mere survival of the state and maintaining a stable balance of power.14 According to Wang Jisi, arguably the best known contemporary Chinese strategist in America, there is a direct link between American hegemony and American liberalism. As Wang says, the idea that “American greatness depends on a world made safe for freedom” is an “immutable tenet.”15 Consequently, Beijing remains convinced (probably correctly) that authoritarian states will forever remain “outsiders” in any U.S-led order and agenda.

c) The Consequences of the Rise of the Corporate State

In addition to Beijing’s suspicion of the political reform motivations behind the “responsible stakeholder” framework, America’s attempts to “manage” China’s rise and encourage domestic political reform is also hindered by the unanticipated rise of the “corporate state” that dominates China’s political economy. As such, due to strict CCP control over economic reforms, a disproportionate amount of resources are placed in the hands of the state (enhancing the potency of China as a foreign policy actor).16
There is a domestic political context to these political economy developments. Following the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the “Tiananmen Interlude” (1989–92), the CCP significantly restructured the PRC’s political-economy. Since the mid-1990s, “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” has placed far more power and wealth in the hands of the state sector than in countries that followed “authoritarian capitalism,” such as Japan and South Korea. Beijing is nurturing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to dominate domestic markets and crowd out the private sector so that the CCP can retain its economic relevance, privileged status in Chinese society, and maintain control over the country’s increasing wealth.17 These SOEs have received over three-quarters of the country’s formal capital over the past decade. This strategy has exacerbated serious societal problems such as corruption and inequality in China, and the so-called Beijing Consensus may yet fail. But for the moment, Beijing does not believe that sweeping economic—much less political—liberalization is required for China’s continued rise.

This economic setup is not just of academic interest. It means Beijing is less likely to be structurally committed to developing a domestic market dominated by private industry and governed by market processes and rule of law—historically, an essential step in the process towards political reform. Private corporations generally depend on open markets and rule of law in domestic and international environments within which to compete and thrive. In contrast, China’s SOEs ultimately succeed or wither away based on the privileges and protection extended to them by the CCP rather than allowing the free market to pick the winners and losers.

Despite Washington’s vision of a free and open global economic system, Beijing’s inclination is to view successful SOEs as instruments of state power and essential for regime security. Such an economy predisposes China to take a mercantilist rather than free-market view of global trade and commerce.

Accepting the Reality of “Strategic Competition”

China is important to the United States because Washington has sensibly accepted the following three realities. First, few things in the world can be achieved without American involvement, but there are many things America cannot achieve by itself. Second, there are a growing number of regional and global problems that cannot be solved without Chinese cooperation. And third, America and China are finding themselves in an economic embrace that cannot be unwound without deleterious consequences for both countries. I would add a fourth reality that is not yet explicitly accepted in Washington policy circles: different material interests and political values prevent the existence of genuine U.S.-China strategic cooperation—at least in the foreseeable future.

If acknowledged, the fourth reality demands that we move beyond a “responsible stakeholder” framework that pursues strategic cooperation towards a policy framework that explicitly recognizes strategic competition as a driving force behind the bilateral relationship. Rather than attempting to manage China’s rise, perhaps the best the U.S. can hope to do is manage the consequences of China’s rise.
There have been serious tensions between the United States and China ever since Bill Clinton initiated the period of “constructive engagement” in the 1990s. Many analysts correctly caution that the relationship with China will remain difficult, but periodic disagreement need not mean permanent ruptures in the relationship. Even so, it is important not to misinterpret China’s genuine desire for functional cooperation on a number of matters as an indication that Beijing desires deep strategic cooperation on issues such as climate change, non-proliferation (North Korea and Iran), and the regional strategic order in Asia.

However, Chinese cooperation should not be mistaken for the fiction that China is eagerly embracing its role as a “responsible stakeholder” in any U.S.-led system, particularly in Asia. Instead, it is better for the Obama and subsequent administrations to recognize the inherent limitations of preventing deep strategic cooperation between the United States and China and work within this reality.

Recognizing China as a “strategic competitor” does not necessarily imply a deterioration in the current bilateral relationship, particularly the complicated economic relationship, which follows a somewhat separate logic of its own. Indeed, although China views America as its primary strategic competitor, it generally seeks tactical and diplomatic cooperation with Washington wherever possible without expecting strategic partnership as the next logical step. Were Washington to do the same, this would prevent it from offering political or strategic concessions to Beijing without receiving much (of strategic value) in return.

Nor does the reality of competition necessarily lead to conflict: explicitly recognizing China as a “strategic competitor” is not the same as treating Beijing as a “strategic adversary.” It is better to confront the reality of competition and create disincentives—such as a deepening of the economic relationship—for both sides to resort to force.

One can also persuasively argue that ignoring the reality of strategic competition as the driving force behind the bilateral relationship can lead to a dangerous incapacity to manage future tensions between the two countries. For example, the U.S.-China Maritime Consultative Agreement was signed in 1998 to herald a new era of bilateral engagement, especially with regard to confidence-building between the American and Chinese navies. Since then, despite a number of dialogues, military-to-military exchanges and countless Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings, there have been no genuinely meaningful confidence-building measures to speak of, and the 1998 Agreement has lapsed into virtual irrelevance. In fact, there were more productive confidence-building initiatives, “hot-lines,” military-to-military exchanges, agreement of protocols, and other frank discussions amongst senior officials from the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s than there are between the United States and China today. The point is that explicit recognition of existing and future competition is more likely to give rise to genuine “competition management” initiatives between the two countries.

**Competing with an Economic Partner**

Although competition means that the contest for influence is a zero-sum game, accepting the reality of competition does not always entail an unaffordable and unsustainable military build-up that would exacerbate the “security dilemma” between
the two countries and damage the critical economic partnership. Instead, a better way forward would be to focus on driving competition to areas that maximize one’s leverage—playing to American strengths and Chinese weaknesses.

The purpose of this paper is not to suggest a comprehensive research agenda for a so-called “competitive strategies” approach since dealing with China is significantly different from dealing with the Soviet Union. But it is worth noting that the first step of a realistic and prudent China-strategy would be to identify areas of leverage that can be used to redirect and redefine competition in areas favorable to American advantage and interests, and will neither be destabilizing nor lead to conflict.

In this context, the Chinese economy is much less impressive and resilient than generally believed. Contrary to the general opinion in foreign policy circles, China has far fewer economic measures for retaliation than is widely feared—a good portent for continued economic cooperation between China and the United States. China still needs Western markets and consumers, technology, innovation, and know-how for its economic growth. The top Chinese SOEs are technically proficient but cannot yet match the innovation and creativity of Western competitors. Besides a thriving export sector heavily dependent on American and European consumers, Chinese economic growth is still dependent on a shaky banking system that lends enormous amounts of capital to inefficient SOEs to generate jobs and prevent large-scale social unrest.

Moreover, China has few options but to park the bulk of its foreign exchange reserves in America given the size of its reserves and the fact that the Central Bank of China needs to continually prop up the value of the American dollar (vis-à-vis the yuan) to support its domestic export industries, which generate the country’s best jobs. If there had been any other viable options besides purchasing American bonds, Beijing would have pursued these years ago. The fear that China has at its disposal economic WMDs that could wreck the American economy is unfounded. By giving the American economy a bloody nose or a black eye, the Chinese economy would lose its own head.

Strategically, China is arguably the loneliest rising power in history. It has no real reliable allies to speak of—not even Russia—and is distrusted by almost every state in Asia. Its relationship with so-called friends such as Myanmar and North Korea is forever awkward and problematic. Even with respect to political values, key Asian states join America in remaining disapproving of China’s authoritarian system, including Japan, South Korea, India, and increasingly Indonesia.

In contrast, American strategic leadership and values are widely accepted even if Washington’s policies periodically draw intense criticism. China therefore profoundly fears isolation and since the early 1990s, its foreign policy has been designed primarily to avert confrontation with America, avoid strategic seclusion, and alleviate regional fears about its rise. China is big enough to be a “spoiler” but also rarely capable of exercising genuine leadership. Instead, it relies on the high cost approach of offering foreign governments temporary economic favors, or else using diplomatic threats, to gain international support.

This provides America with a strong case to downplay the importance of Chinese acquiescence in its search for a grand Asian strategy. Instead, Washington needs to secure common ground with and cooperation from other key states on an issue-by-issue basis before seeking Chinese cooperation.
Even if this occurred in the previous decade, the successful U.S. initiative to grant India a special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008 illustrates the effectiveness of initially “ignoring,” then “isolating,” before “pressuring” China—after securing agreement from other players. Despite the intense China-India strategic rivalry, Beijing ultimately put aside its objections to the deal and abstained in the final vote as it did not want to appear isolated on the issue. Even in situations where this tactic might be inappropriate, it prevents offering unilateral concessions to a strategic competitor rather than genuine partners.

It is not in America’s or its allies’ interest to contain China’s economic rise. However, the need to explicitly “compete” is as important as continuing to seek tactical cooperation on issues. If Beijing continues to extend its influence in the region at the expense of Washington, smaller Asian states are much more likely to “hedge” by increasingly band-wagoning with China since they would have few alternatives.

Finally, there is a strong economic and strategic logic for America facilitating the rise of friendly Asian centers of power that will both constrain any Chinese bid for hegemony and allow the United States to retain its position as Asia’s decisive strategic actor. The two most important countries here are Japan and India whose interests are remarkably aligned with that of the United States. The Philippines and Vietnam are two further countries who might yet play a minor spoiler role. The priority here is not to dictate policy to these countries but to ensure that they both command sufficient independent strategic and military weight to “restrain” Chinese strategic objectives in their immediate environment into the future. This will help perpetuate a long-standing objective in American foreign policy first articulated by Averell Harriman to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1947: “a balance of power preponderantly in favor of the free countries.”

Conclusion

Given the U.S.-China economic relationship and China’s importance in Asia, America’s temptation is to seek a comprehensive cooperative framework to perpetuate its leadership and "tame" a rising China in order to promote stability in the region. Increasing economic interdependence does create common interests, and structured dialogues can reduce misunderstanding. But as Asia’s preeminent power and civilization for all but 200 of the past 3,000 years, China is too big, proud, and independently minded for America to “tame” or “manage.” Washington cannot hope to decisively determine the endgame for an authoritarian China—in which the CCP, leading a country of 1.4 billion people, will choose to become a “responsible stakeholder” within a U.S.-led order.

Instead, America and its allies need to confront the reality that the CCP’s two primary objectives—overseeing China’s re-emergence as the dominant power in Asia and retaining its exclusive hold on political power—are fundamentally incompatible with Washington’s vision for Asia and hopes for China.

Strategic competition—especially in an era of a rising great power—is a well-established reality for international relations theory and history. U.S. foreign policy and interaction with Beijing must be based on accepting the reality that “strategic competition” between the United States and China is real, already occurring, and likely
to continue into the foreseeable future. It is an honest acknowledgement of a contest taking place over not just the accumulation of material power and influence, but also a competition to determine the shape of the region. If America is to retain its leadership in the Asia-Pacific and promote continued peace, as presidents since Harry Truman have promised to do, then Washington needs to help strengthen the incentives for peace (i.e. promote China’s economic interaction with the world) and simultaneously develop a strategic framework for competing effectively with China—especially in Asia.

In his remarks at the 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, President Obama argued that “the pursuit of power amongst nations must no longer be seen as a zero-sum game.” Unfortunately, reality dictates otherwise. Assuming that strategic competition is taking place is far more preferable and prudent than relying on a flawed “responsible stakeholder” framework.

Finally, that the Chinese economy is intimately intertwined with the American and global economies offers the promise of tactical cooperation on many issues. Combined with the reality that significant instability in East Asia would wreak enormous damage on the Chinese economy and seriously threaten the legitimacy of the CCP, there is every chance that the contest for influence can remain bounded, manageable and ultimately peaceful – provided the U.S. and its allies are willing to compete effectively.
Notes

3 Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly 32:3, 2009, 91. Christensen was one of the key officials behind the formulation of the “responsible stakeholder” framework.
5 Note that the “responsible stakeholder” framework was also designed to hasten political reform within China as the country’s development is increasingly shaped by the external liberal order.
8 Ibid.
12 See transcript of President Bill Clinton’s press conference with Jiang Zemin, January 28, 1997.
19 This refers to the condition where attempts to increase the security of one state through a military build-up can increase the insecurity of another state, leading to an arms race and an increased chance of mistrust and possibly conflict. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).